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Vor,. XX 
MICHIGAN 
LAW REVIEW 
NOVEMBER, r92r No. r 
THE SUPREME COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN r920-r92r 
T HIS review of Supreme Court decisions on constitutional law during the October Term of r920 follows the plan of its 
predecessors.1 Its aim is the modest one of exposing the precise 
points decided and the precise or unprecise reasons given in sup-
port of the results reached. A valiant effort is made to refrain 
from criticism or from adding anything to the contributions of the 
judges. In the footnotes are assembled references to discussions 
of the cases reviewed in the text and of other issues of constitu-
tional law considered in recognized law journals from October, 
r920, to October, r92r. No effort has been made to sift the chaff 
from the wheat except to exclude references to mere news items 
m commercial periodicals. 
I. ·MrscELLANEous NATIONAr, PowERS 
An important question with respect to the time element in the 
procedure for adopting amendments to the federal Constitution 
was answered in Dillon v. Gloss,2 which rejected a contention that 
the Eighteenth Amendment was not validly adopted because Con-
gress in proposing it to the states had declared that it should be 
inoperative unless ratified within seven years. The premise on 
which the constitutionality of this restriction was based was broader 
than necessary, since it was laid down that amendments proposed 
by Congress would die of inanition if not ratified within a reason-
able time. Mr. Justice Van Devanter recognized that the Consti-
tution contains no express provision on the subject, but he pointed 
1 12 A:1.r. PoL. Ser. REv. 17-49, 427-457, 640-666, 13 id. 47-77; 229-250, 6o7-
633, 14 id. 53-73, and 19 MICH. L. REv. 1-34, u7-151, 283-323: 
2 256 u~ S. -, 41 Sup.' Ct. 510 (1921). 
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out that "with the Constitution, as with a statute or other written 
instrument, what is reasonably implied is as much a part of it as 
what is expressed." The implication that amendments must be 
ratified with reasonable celerity was wrought out of the considera-
tions that proposal and ratification are interrelated and "succeed-
ing steps in a single endeavor," and therefore steps "not to be 
widely separated in time" ; that amendments are to be proposed 
only when deemed necessary by Congress, and therefore are to be 
"considered and disposed of presently"; and that the requirement 
of ratification by three-fourths of the states leads to the inference 
that the ratification "must be sufficiently contemporaneous in that 
number of states to reflect the will of the people in all sections at 
relatively the same period, which of course ratification scattered 
through a long series of years would not do." The opinion com-
mends the statement of Judge Jameson that "an alteration of the 
Constitution proposed today has relation to the sentiment and the 
felt needs of today, and that, if not ratified early while that senti-
ment may fairly be supposed to exist, it ought to be regarded as 
waived, and not again to be voted upon, unless a second time pro-
posed by Congress," and concludes that "the fair inference or impli-
cation from Article 5 is that the ratification must be within some 
reasonable time after the proposal." Of the specific limitation 
imposed by Congress on the ratification of the Eighteenth Amend-
ment it is said : 
"Of the power of Congress, keeping within reasonable 
limits, to fix a definite period for the ratification we enter-
tain no doubt. As a rule the Constitution speaks in general 
terms, leaving Congress to deal with subsidiary matters or · 
detail as the public interests and changing conditions may 
require; and Article 5 is no exception to the rule. Whether 
a definite period for ratification shall be fixed, so that all 
may know what it is and speculation on what is a reasonable 
time may be avoided, is, in our opinion, a matter of detail 
which Congress may determine as an incident of its power 
to . designate the mode of ratification. It is not questioned 
that seven years, the period fixed in this instance, was rea-
sonable, if power existed to fix a definite time; nor could it 
well be questioned, considering the period within which prior 
amendments were ratified." 
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Another point settled by the decision is that amendments are 
ratified and become part of the Constitution when the requisite 
number of states act favorably, and that the court will take judicial 
notice of t!J.e ratifications. A decision on this point was necessary 
since the National Prohibition Act was by its terms to be in force 
"from and after the date when the Eighteenth Amendment should 
go into effect, and the latter by its own terms was to go into effect 
one year after being ratified," and the offense of the petitioner was 
committed exactly one year after the ratification was consummated 
and so less than one year after the proclamation of ratification 
issued by the ·Secretary of State.3 
The scope of the Eighteenth Amendment was involved in the 
contentions raised in Street v. Lincoln Safe Deposit Co.;1 but eight 
members of the court found that the Volstead Act does not pro-
hibit the storage with a safe deposit company of liquor lawfully 
acquired before the Eighteenth Amendment and there kept in the 
exclusive possession and control of its owner and designed for 
use only by himself, family and guests. This construction of the 
statute made it unnecessary to pass upon the constitutional question. 
Mr. Justice McReynolds, however, in concurring, observed: 
"I think the Volstead Act was properly interpreted by 
the court below; but to enforce it as thus construed would 
result in virtual confiscation of lawfully acquired liquors by 
preventing or unduly interfering with their consumption by 
the owner. The Eighteenth Amendment gave no such power 
to Congress. Manufacture, sale and transportation are the 
_things prohibited; not personal use."5 
3 For a note on a case refusing to issue a mandamus to compel Secretary 
of State Colby to revoke his proclamation of the ratification of the Eighteenth 
Amendment, see 20 CoLUM. L. Rev'. 912. For discussions of the power to 
amend the federal Constitution see William L. Marbury, "The Nineteenth 
Amendment and After," 7 VA. L. REv. I; Everett P. Wheeler, "Limit of-
Power to Amend Constitution,'' 7 A. B. A. JoURN. 75; and Bruce Williams, 
"The Popular Mandate on Constitutional Amendments", 7 VA. L. Rev. 28o. 
A question as to the validity of the submission of an amendment to the 
Alabama constitution is considered in 5 MINN. L. Rev. 551. 
4 254 U.S. 88, 41 Sup. Ct. 31 (1920). Seel 34 HARV. L. Rev. 437, 15 Ir,r,. 
L. Rev. 405, 6 VA. L. R:eG. n. s. 6go, and 7 VA. L. Rev. 400. I 
5 For discussion of cases on various aspects of the Volstead Act see 20 
CoLuM. L. Rtv. 912, 15 ILL. L. REv. 404, 532, and 5 MINN. L. Rev. 482. 
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Too late for :inclusion in the review of constitutional law· for 
1919-1920, Mr. Justice Clarke filed a dissent to the opinion of the 
-court in National Prohibition Cases.6 His objections were restricted 
to the eighth, ninth and eleventh paragraphs of the opinion, which, 
he said, "taken together, in effect declare the Volstead Act to be the 
supreme law of the land-paramount to any state law with which it 
may conflict in any respect." The eleventh conclusion also "approves 
as valid a definition of liquor a.s intoxicating which is expressly 
admitted not to be intoxicating in each of the cases in which it is con-
sidered." This, says Mr. Justice Clarke, is not appropriate legislation 
to enforce the prohibition of the first section of the amendment 
against intoxicating liquor, since that section does not give "that 
plenary power over the subject which the legislatures of the states 
derive from the people or which may be derived from the war 
powers of the Constitution." As to the interpretation of the court 
that the powers of Congress under the amendment are paramount 
to those of the states, Mr. Justice Clarke insists that this reads out 
of the second section the word "concurrent," which means "joint 
·and equal authority," "running together, having the same authority." 
Congress, therefore, must be joined by the states in any legislation 
which depends upon the Eighteenth Amendment for its validity. 
This still leaves Congress independent power over interstate com-
merce. Moreover, the first section of the Eighteenth Amendment 
renders invalid any state law which attempts to recognize as lawful 
any intoxicating liquor proscribed by that section.7 
Questions as to the exercise of war powers arose in several cases. 
The sections of the Trading with the Enemy Act relating to the 
seizure of property in which enemies have an interest were sus-
G 253 u.\ s. 350, 407, 40 Sup. Ct. 486, 588 (1920), 19 MICH. L. REV. 4-8. 
Discussion of the National Prohibition Cases will be found in \V. F. Dodd, 
"Amending the Federal Constitution", 30 YAL~ L. J. 32I, Charles W. Need-
ham; "Changing the Fundamental Law", 69 U. PA. L. Riw. 223; and notes 
in I9 MICH. L. REV. 329 and 6 VA. L. REG. n. s. 3or. 
7 The effect of the Eighteenth Amendment and federal legislation there-
under on the powers of the states is considered. in Minor Bronough, "Effect 
-0f Federal Legislation on State Liquor Laws", 25 LAW NoTES 49; J.B. Whit-
field, "Do the Eighteenth .Amendment! and the Volstead Act Supersede State 
Prohibitions and Regulations?", 24 LAW NoTES 85; and notes in 34 HARV. 
L. REv. 3I7, 328, I6 !LL. L. Riw. I4l, I9 MICH. L. Riw. 435, 647, and 7 VA. 
L. REv. 479. 
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tained in Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan-8 and Stoehr v. Garvan.9 
The first case was a libel brought by the Alien Property Custodian 
to get possession of certain securities. Claimants appeared and 
denied that the funds were held for the benefit of an enemy and 
insisted that they had a right to have the question settled before 
the transfer was ordered. "The court answered that the present pro-
ceeding gives nothing but the preliminary custody that might have 
been obtained by summary seizure and that it is open to claimants 
in a separate action to litigate the question of enemy ownership. 
The power of Congress "to provide for an immediate seizure in 
war times of property supposed to belong to the enemy, as it could 
provide for an attachment or distraint, . if adequate provision is 
made for a return in case of a mistake," was said to be without 
doubt. In the Stoehr case the statute was said to be strictly a war 
measure and to find · its sanction in the constitutional provision 
empowering Congress "to declare war, grant letters of marque and 
reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water." 
Here certain corporate stocks had been seized by the Custodian and 
a claimant brought a suit for.their return. His objection that it is 
inconsistent with due process to take over the property otherwise 
than through a judicial proceeding brought the complete reply that 
"there is no warrant for saying that the enemy ownership must be 
determined judicially before the property can be seized; and the 
practice has been the other way." In both cases it was pointed out 
that the court has power to order a re-transfer if in proper pro-
ceedings the claimant proves his right. In the Stoehr case the dis-
pute as to enemy ownership was considered and decided adversely 
to the claimant.10 
8 254 U. S. 554, 41 Sup. Ct. 214 ( 1921). 
0 2551 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 293 (1921). 
10 An English decision on the confiscation of private enemy property 
is considered in 30 Y AL£ L. J. 845. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416, 40 
Sup. Ct. 382 (I920), I9 MICH. L. Rsv. II, which sustained the federal mi-
gratory bird treaty and the act of Congress passed to enforce the treaty, is 
discussed in 6 CoRNtLr. L. Q. 9I. For articles on various aspects of federal 
power over foreign relations see Minor Bronough, "Federal Protection of 
Treaty Rights of Aliens", 25 LAW No:rts 65; John W. Davis, "Treaty-Making 
Power in the United States," 6 A. B. A. ]OUR. I; John M. Mathews, "The 
States and Foreign Relations", I9 MICH. L. Rsv. 690, and "The Termina-
tion of War", I9 1flcH. L. Rsv. 8I9; David Hunter Miller, "Some Results 
6 'MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Two cases sustaining judgments of courts martial deal mainly 
with questions of statutory construction, but touch incidentally on 
constitutional issues. Kahn v. Anderson11 affirms that the Fifth 
Amendment is not violated by trying military prisoners by courts 
martial for offenses committed during their imprisonment, even 
though, as a result of their original conviction and sentences, they 
have ceased to be soldiers. This case and Givens v. Zerbst1'2 both 
hold that the provision in the Articles of War forbidding court-
martial trials for murder in time of peace refer to "peace in the 
complete sense, officially declared." The War Prohibition Cases13 
are cited for the propositiqn that it is indisputable "that complete 
peace, in the legal sense, had not come to pass by the effect of the 
Armistice and the cessation of hostilities."14 
A combination of the war power and the postal power appeared 
in United States ez rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing 
Co. v. Burleson,15 in which the court sustained the Postmaster Gen-
eral in his revocation of the second-class mailing privilege previ-
ously enjoyed by Mr. Victor Berger's paper, The Milwa1ikee Leader. 
The Espionage Act provided that any newspaper published in vio-
lation of any of its provisions should be "non-mailable" and should 
not be "conveyed in the mails or delivered from any post office or 
by any letter carrier." An official of the Post Office Department, 
after a hearing, decided that The Milwaukee Leader had repeatedly 
violated the Espionage Law. An order was thereupon issued revok-
ing the second-class mailing privilege. This meant that future issues 
could not be mailed at second-class rates until a new application for 
the second-class privilege was made and granted. Such issues were 
of the Labor Clauses of the Treaty of Versailles'', 6 CORNELL L. Q. 133; 
Fred K. Nielsen, "Some Vexatious Questions Relating to Nationality", 20 
COLUM. L. Rtv. 840; J. Whitla Stinson, "The Treaty-Making Power and 
the Restraint of the Common Law'', I. BosTON U. L. Rev. III; and Charles 
S. Thomas, "The Power of Congress to Establish Peace", 55 AM. L. Rev. 86. 
11255 U. S. r, 41 Sup. Ct. 224 (1921). See 16 II.L. L. Rev. 67, and 30 
YALE L. J. 521. 
12255 U. S. n, 41 Sup. Ct. 227 (1921). 
13 Hamilton vs. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 25Ii U. S. 146, 40 Sup. Ct. rn6 
(1919), 19 M1cH. L. Rev. 8. 
14 The jurisdiction of courts martial is discussed in 34 HARv. L. Rev. 
659, 673, and 16 ILL. L. Rev. 56. 
15 255 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 352 (1921). See 16 ILL. L. Rtv. 134 19 MICH. 
L. Rev. 7.28, and 30 YALE L. J. 859. 
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not, however, excluded from the mails. They might still be sent 
upon payment of higher rates of postage. Mr. Justice Clarke in the 
opinion of the court points to no specific statutory authority for the 
power exercised by the Postmaster General. He says that "when, 
for more than five months, a paper had contained, almost daily, 
articles which under the express terms of the statute rendered it 
'non-mailable,' it was reasonable to conclude that it would continue 
its disloyal publications, and it was therefore clearly within the 
power given to the Postmaster General * * * 'to execute all laws 
relating to the postal service,' to enter, as was done in this case, an 
order suspending the privilege until a proper application and show-
ing should be made for its renewal." Mr. Justice Holmes in a brief 
dissent insists that "the question of the rate has nothing to do with 
the question whether the matter is mailable, and affirms that he is 
"satisfied that the Postmaster cannot determine in advance that 
a certain newspaper is going to be non-mailable and on that 
ground deny to it not the use of the mails but the rate of postage 
that the statute says shall be charged." The only power he finds 
conferred by statute is to refrain from forwarding specific issues 
when received and to return them to the senders. While he pro-
fessedly confines himself to questions of -statutory construction, he 
refers to "the ease with which the power claimed by the Postmaster 
could be used to interfere with very sacred rights," and concludes 
"that the refusal to allow the relator the rate to which it was entitled 
whenever its newspaper was carried, on the ground that the paper 
ought not to be carried at all, was unjustified by statute and was 
a serious attack upon liberties that not even the war induced Con-
gress to infring~." 
In a separate lengthy dissent Mr. Justice Brandeis raises a "suc-
cession of constitutional doubts" which he gives as added reasons 
for not endowing the Postmaster General with a power not spe-
cifically conferred by statute. He does not go so far as to affirm 
that all these doubts are well founded, but the fact that he is in a 
minority of two establishes that seven of the judges are convinced 
that none of them is well founded. Thus, Mr. Justice Brandeis's 
dissent makes more explicit the constitutional law laid down by the 
majority. We know, then, that the denial by the Postmaster Gen-
eral of the second-class mailing privilege on account of past dere-
lictions found by him and confirmed by the court does not uncon-
8 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
stitutfonally abridge the freedom o{ the press, nor "subject publish-
ers to punishment without a hearing in any court," nor inflict "severe 
punishment for an infamous crime without trial by jury," nor deprive 
"publishers of their property without due process of law," nor impose 
excessive fines or unusual punishment. The majority opinion 
refrains from detailed dissipation of these suggested doubts and 
contents itself with pointihg out that the Espionage Act has been 
held constitutional, and that it has been repeatedly decided that "a 
hearing, such as was accorded the relator, on precisely such a ques-
tion as is here involved, when fairly conducted, satisfies all the 
requirements of due process of law." In commendation of the result 
reached Mr. Justice Clarke says: 
"This is neither a dangerous nor an arbitrary power, as 
was argued at the bar, for it is not only subject to review by 
the courts (the claim of the relator was heard and rejected 
by two courts before this re-examination of it in this court), 
but it is also subject to control by Congress and by the Pres-
ident of the United States. Under that Constitution, which 
we shall find it vehemently denouncing, the rights of the 
relator were, and are, amply protected by the opportunity 
thus given it to resort for relief to all three departments of 
the government, if those rights should be invaded by any 
ruling of the Postmaster General." 
The review then undertaken is to discover "whether substantial 
evidence to support his order may be found in the facts stated in 
the Postmaster General's answer, which are admitted by the demur-
rer." The guiding principle of this inquiry is that ·"the conclusion 
of the head of lJ.n executive department of the government on such 
a question, when within his jurisdiction, will not be disturbed by 
the courts unless they are clearly of the opinion that it is wrong." 
How far· from wrong Mr. Justice Clarke found this finding may 
be inferred from his comment that the relator did not choose to 
"mend its ways, to publish a paper conforming to the law, and then 
to apply anew for a second-class mailing privilege * * * but for rea-
. sons not difficult to imagine it preferred this futile litigation, under-
taken upon the theory that a government competent to wage war 
against its foreign enemies was powerless against its insidious foes 
at home." 
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The effort of Congress under the war power to restrict the prices 
of necessaries was frustrated by United States v. L. Cohen Grocery 
Co.,16 Weeds, Inc., v. United States,17 and other cases18 decided at 
the same time, but the only question of the war power specifically 
adjudicated was that "the mere existence of a state of war could 
not suspend or change the operation upon the powers of Congress 
of the guaranties and limitations of the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments" with respect to the statute under consideration. "It follows," 
remarked Chief Justice White, "that in testing the operation of the 
Constitution upon the subject here involved the question of the 
existence or non-existence of a state of war becomes negligible, and 
we put it out of view." The issue thus laid on the table was the 
one raised by the contention that "as the country was virtually at 
peace Congress had no power to regulate the subject'' of the prices 
to be charged for necessaries. This, it is to be observed, is not the 
issue whether such price regulation is within the war power when 
circumstances concededly bring the war po\ver into play. No such 
contention appears to have been urged before the court. Technic-
ally, therefore, it is still undetermined whether the regulation of the 
prices of necessaries is within the war powers of Congress. Yet 
the failure to raise or to consider a point so fundamental lends 
strong assurance to the assumption that an objection that the war 
power does not include regulation of the prices of necessaries 
would be held without merit. The legislation before the court 
failed because of the absence of any definite standard by which to 
ascertain what was prohibitecj.. This point will be considered in a 
later section on immunities of persons charged with crime.19 
1°255 U.S. 8I, 4I Sup. Ct. 2g8 (I92I). See I6 ILL. L. REv. 66, I9 MICH. 
L. REv. 648, 69 U. PA. L. REv. 38I, and 30 YALJ~ L. J. 639. Comment on the 
case in the court below or on others on the same point appears in 2I CoLUM. 
L. REv. 394, 24 LAW Notts rn5, I9 MrcH. L. REv: 336, 337, 5 MINN. L. Rtv. 
298, 6g U. PA. L. REv. 56, 6 VA. L. REG. n. s. 935, and 30 YALE L. J. 81, g8, 99. 
17 255 U. S. rn9, 41 Sup. Ct. 3o6 (1921). 
1 8 Tedrow v. A. T. Lewis & Son Dry Goods Co., 255 U. S. 98, 41 Sup. 
Ct. 303 (192I); Kennington v. Palmer, 255 U. S. IOO, 41 Sup. Ct. 303 (1921);. 
Kinnane v. Detroit Creamery Co., 255 U.S. 102, 41 Sup. Ct. 304 (I921); C. A. 
Weed & Co. v. Lockwood, 255 U. S. I04, 41 Sup. Ct. 305 (I921); G. S. Wil-
lard Co. v. Palmer, 255 U. S. ro6, 41 Sup. Ct. 305 (1921). 
10 While the special circumstances created by the war were referred to 
in Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 458 (192I), sustaining an act 
of Congress regulating rents in the District of Columbia, the source of the 
IO MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
The question whether the existence or the exercise of federal 
power precludes the exercise of state power over the same general 
field was 'involved in Gilbert v. Minnesota, 20 which sustained a con-
viction for violating a state statute forbidding persons to advocate 
or teach that men should not enlist in the military or naval forces 
of the United States. Mr. Justice McKenna for the majority of 
the court held the objection that the state statute is an encroach-
ment on federal authority to be one not warranted by the letter of 
the constitutional provisions with respect to war and one that could 
be maintained only on the broad proposition "that a state has no 
interest or concern in the United States or its armies or power of 
protecting them from public enemies." To this he answered that 
"this country is one composed of many and must on occasions be 
animated as one, and that the constituted and constituting sovereign-
ties must have power of cooperation against the enemies of all." 
The Minnesota statute. in question was said not to conflict with 
any exercise of federal power, nor to usurp any national power, 
but only to render a service thereto. Mr. Justice Holmes confined 
his concurrence to the result, and Chief Justice White dissented 
briefly, "being of the opinion that the subject-matter is within the 
exclusive legislative power of Congress, when exerted, and that the 
action of Congress has covered the whole field." Mr. Justice Bran-
deis was more elaborate in dissent. He found the Minnesota statute 
not a war measure because not confined to time of war .. He con-
strued it to be one forbidding the teaching of the doctrine of pacif-
1c1sm. It was, "when enacted, inconsistent with the law of the 
United States, because at that time Congress still permitted free 
discussion of these governmental functions." After the Espionage 
Laws of the national government which prohibited only "certain 
tangible obstructions to the conduct of the existing war with the 
congressional authority was tacitly assumed to be the general legislative 
power over the federal district and the war power was not mentioned in 
either the majority or the minority opinion. The dispute among the judges 
was confined to the question whether the act offends constitutional limita-
tions in favor of liberty and property. This case and Hollis v. Kutz, 255 
U. S. -, 4r Sup. Ct. 37r (r92r), which involved a complaint against gas 
rates in the District of Columbia, are treated in a subsequent section on 
police power. 
20 254 U. S. 325, 4r Sup. Ct. ,r25 (r920). See 2r CoLuM. L. Rsv. 483, 
15 ILL. L. Rsv. 530, 19 MICH. L. Rsv. 870, and 30 YALE L. J. 623. 
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German Empire committed with criminal intent,'' the Minnesota law 
produced inconsistency between exercises of state and of federal 
power, since under it "teaching or advice that men should not enlist 
is made punishable, although the jury should find (r) that the 
teaching or advocacy proved wholly futile and no obstruction 
resulted; (2) that there was no intent to obstruct; and the court, 
taking judicial notice of the facts, should rule (3) that, when the 
words were written or spoken, the United States was at peace with 
all the world." The questi9n of what freedom of discussion should 
obtain with respect to war and its measures and policies is one of 
vital national interest, and the freedom which Congress may deem 
it desirable to allow should not be curbed by inconsistent state legis-
lation. Mr. Justice Brandeis's further grounds of dissent shade off 
into considerations relating to freedom of speech and to state inter-
ference with federal functions, and will be considered in later sec-
tions. He insisted that the provisions of the state law and its title 
"preclude a contention that its purpose was to prevent breaches of 
the peace," and therefore deprive it of support a!\ a general police 
measure enacted under the reserved powers of the states, as the 
majority had urged. But he added that, whatever its source, it must 
fail, since ''when the United States has exercised its exclusive pow-
ers * * * so far as to take possession of the field, the states no more 
can supplement its requirements than it can annul them."21 
Two cases involve questions of the power of Congress over 
Indians and Indian lands. LaMotte v. United States2~ sanctioned 
the power of the national government to maintain a suit in the 
interest of the Indians to restrain outsiders from obtaining leases 
from the Indians in violation of the restrictions imposed by Con-
21 Aspects of the relation between federal and state power are discussed 
in William P. Bynum, "State) Rights and Federal Power", 55 AM. L, REv. l,' 
and William D. Guthrie, "Federal Government and Education", 7 A. B. A. 
JouR. 14-
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149, 40 Sup. Ct. 438 (1920), 
19 MICH. L. REv. 13, 'which declared unconstitutional an act of Congress 
making state workmen's compensation laws applicable to injuries within the 
admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts, is considered in 8 CALIF. L. 
REv. 338, and 31 HARV. L. REv. 82. An instance of the enforcement in 
admiralty of rights created under state law is commented on in 21 Cor,uM. 
L. REv. 5g6. The federal ship mortgage act is treated in 20 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 788. 
22 254 U. S. 570, 41 Sup. Ct. 204 (1921). 
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gress and of the regulations of the Secretary of the Interior. Winton 
v. Amos23 held it proper for Congress to authorize the bringing of 
a suit to impose a charge on Indian funds and Indian lands for the 
value of services rendered by attorneys in securing participation in 
those funds and lands by a class of Indians. The Indians in ques-
tion appeared to have become citizens of Mississippi by failing to 
remove with other members of their tribe to the Indian Territory. 
This state citizenship did not turn out to be extremely beneficial and 
Congress at length provided that the descendants of those who 
remained in the old hunting grounds might remove to the Indian 
Territory and there participate in the blessings enjoyed by their 
fellow Choctaws. Attorneys who were instrumental in bringing 
·about this legislation and in furthering the identification and removal 
of the Indians who benefited therefrom were authorized to bring 
the suit before the court to recover a reasonable sum for their serv-
ices. Provision for such compensation was held not to deny due 
process of law to the Indians who would be the poorer for its pay-
ment. In reaching the res?lt Mr. Justice Pitney observed: 
"It is thoroughly established that Congress has plenary 
authority over the Indians and all their tribal relations, and 
full power to legislate concerning their tribal property. The 
guardianship arises from their condition of tutelage or 
dependency; and it rests with Congress to determine when 
the relationship shall cease; the mere grant of rights of citi-
zenship not being sufficient to terminate it."24 
An act of Congress limiting the amount to be spent by candi-
dates for nomination for the United States Senate was declared 
unconstitutional by a vote of five to four in Newberry v. United 
States.25 The statute under which ':Mr. Newberry was indicted was 
23 255 U.S.-, 41 Sup. Ct. 342 (1921). 
24 An instance of federal control over the transfer of land by Indians 
appears in Blanset v. Cardin, 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 519 (1921), in which 
the only issue appears to be one of statutory construction. The federal 
legislation, as construed by the court, was held to preclude the application 
of state law. 
The right of alien enemies to inherit land is discussed in 15 ILL. L. REv. 
337, 459, and 5 MINN. L. REv. 373. In 30 YALE L. J. 625 is a note on the 
deportation of alien communists. 
25 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 469 (1921). All the court agreed that the 
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passed before the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment pro-
viding for the direct election of senators, and Mr. Justice McKenna 
announced that he concurred in the opinion of the court only as 
applied to the particular statute before it. He reserved the question 
of the power of Congress under the Seventeenth Amendment. He 
must have agreed with the point made in the court's opinion that 
the statute "must be tested by powers possessed at the time of its 
enactment,'' since "an after-acquired power cannot e.x proprio vigore 
validate a statute void. when enacted." This makes it hard to see 
how Mr. Justice Pitney can be right when in his dissenting opinion 
he says that "it is clear-indeed, undisputed-that, for present pur-
poses," the statute is "to receive the same construction and effect 
as if enacted after adoption of the amendment." Mr. Justice Pitney 
adds nothing to reinforce this position, but the Chief Justice in a 
separate dissent implies vaguely that the Seventeenth Amendment 
adds some sanction to the constitutionality of the prior statute. He 
says that "as the nominating primary was held after the adoption 
of the Seventeenth Amendment, the. power must have been sanc-
tioned by that amendment," and he considers "the question of the 
power, first from the provisions of the Constitution as they existed 
before the amendment, and second in contemplation of the light 
thr~wn upon the subject by the force of the amendment.' Under 
this second head he relies on the fact that the amendment as first 
proposed in the Senate and as first passed by the House left the 
states in full control of the election of senators, but that as finally 
submitted for ratification and as ratified and promulgated it left in 
force the original power to make or _alter regulations as to the man-
ner of holding elections for senators, thus preserving the revisory 
power which Congress enjoyed under the original Constitution when 
senators were chosen by the state legislatures. From this the Chief 
Justice concludes: 
"When the plain purpose of the amendment is thus seen, 
and it is borne in mind that at the time it was pending the 
amendment to the Corrupt Practices Act dealing with state 
trial court had given an erroneous interpretation of the statute. The con-
clusion that the statute was unconstitutional was reached over the dissent 
of Chief Justice White and Justices Pitney, Brandeis and Clarke. See 19 
MrcH. L. Rev. 860. 
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primaries for nominating United States Senators which is 
now before us was in the process of consideration in Con-
gress, and wheri it is further remembered that after the pass-
age of the amendment Congress enacted legislation so that 
the amendmen{ might be applied to state senatorial pri-
maries, there would seem to be an end to all doubt as to the 
power of Congress." 
Just how the Seventeenth Amendment can be a prop to prior 
legislation is not specifically set forth by the Chief Justice. Very 
possibly he means no more than that it confirms the power previ-
ously possessed. He introduces liis discussion of the Amendment 
by saying that "from a somewhat different point of view the same 
result is even more imperative." 
Mr. Justice McReynolds in the opinion of the court says that "a 
concession that the "'Seventeenth Amendment might be applicable 
to this controversy if assisted by appropriate legislation would be 
unimportant, since there is noJ:Ie." This, taken alone, would lead 
us to believe that he and Justices Holmes, Day and Van Devanter, 
who agree with him, leave open the question of the power of Con-
gress subsequent to the amendment. But this would be inconsistent 
with his syllogistic argument that the power of Congress is con-
fined to the manner of holding elections, that nominations are not 
.elections and therefore Congress cannot regulate the manner of 
holding primaries. Moreover, Mr. Justice McKenna would not 
have noted his reservation as to the power of Congress under the 
amendment had he not understood that the opinion of the court 
contains no such reservation. The absence of any such reservation 
is to be inferred also from Mr. Justice McReynolds's statement 
that "as finally submitted and adopted the amendment does not 
undertake to modify Article r, Section 4, the source of congres-
sional power to regulate the times, places and manner of holding 
elections." That section, he points out, remains "intact and appli-
cable both to the election of representatives and senators." Out of 
this confusion it seems clear that the decision must be confined to 
an attempt by Congress to regulate senatorial primaries at a time 
when under the Constitution senators were chosen by the state 
legislatures. :Mr. Justice McKenna invites Congress to try again, 
now that senators are chosen by the state electorates. He seems 
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also to prevent the decision from applying to the existing congres-
sional regulation of primary nominations for representatives, since 
it is difficult to differentiate the election of representatives from the 
election of senators after the Seventeenth Amendment. The only 
distinction is that the electorate for senators is a state-wide one, 
while congressmen as a rule represent constituencies in lesser dis-
tricts. This distinction does not apply to representatives-at-large, 
and it is hard to find any significance in it for district representa-
tives. There is, therefore, only a minority of the court definitely 
registered against the power of Congress to regulate senatorial and 
congressional primaries under the provisions of the Constitution as 
they stand today. 
So much for the scope of the decision. Its basis is that the con-
gressional power is confined to elections and that a nominating pri-
mary is not an election. This is the answer to the contention that 
the power exercised by the statute in question is an enumerated 
power conferred by Section 4, Article I of the Constitution, which 
reads: 
"The times, places and manner of holding elections for 
senators and representatives shall be prescribed in each state 
by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time 
by law make and alter such regulations, except as to the 
places of choosing senators." 
The power, insists Mr. Justice McReynolds, is to regulate the 
manner of holding elections, "not broadly to regulate them." While 
as an incident to the grant there is power to make all laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying it into effect, this does 
not include control over primaries, for the choice of the candidates 
"is in no real sense part of the manner of holding the election" and 
"does not directly affect the manner of holding the election." Con-
trol over primaries is not necessary in order to effectuate the power 
expressly granted. "Many things are prerequisites to elections or 
may affect their outcome-voters, education, means of transporta-
tion, health, public discussion, immigration, private animosities, even 
the face and figure of the candidate; but authority to regulate the 
manner of holding them gives no right to control any of these." It 
would not be contended that Congress might have regulated the 
choice of members of the state legislatures when these legislatures 
chose the senators. The word "election," since the Seventeenth 
16 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Amendment as before, has the same general significance of "final 
choice of an officer by the duly qualified electors." The fact that 
senators hold offices created by the Constitution gives Congress no 
"indefinite, undefined power" over their election. The supposed 
anomaly of unrestricted state power to control matters affecting the 
choice of national officers warrants no inference of national power, 
since "the federal features of our government are so clear and have 
been so often declared that no valuable discussion can proceed upon 
the opposite construction." The exercise of the power here claimed 
by Congress "would interfere with purely domestic affairs of the 
state and infringe upon liberties reserved to the people." The state 
by its inherent police power "may suppress whatever evils may be 
incident to primary or convention." The control of each House of 
Congress over the election of its own members and the power of 
Congress to regulate the times, places and manner of holding elec-
tions renders the national government "not without power to pro-
tect itself against corruption, fraud or other malign influences." 
In dissenting, Mr. Justice P~tney insists that power to regulate 
"the manner of holding elections" can mean "nothing less than the 
entire mode of procedu:re-the essence, not merely the form of con-
ducting the elections." In "the essential sense" the examination of 
the qualifications of candidates and of electors, "opportunity for the 
electors to consider and canvass the claims of the eligibles." and 
some method of narrowing the choice by eliminating candidates are 
parts of the complex process of an election-i. e., of the "choosing 
of a person by vote to fill a public office." It should be as easy "to 
recognize the integral relation of the several steps in the process of 
election" as it is to recognize the same relation in successive steps 
of interstate commerce as is done when transportation "incidentally 
interrupted for a temporary purpose; or proceeding under successive 
bills of lading or means of transport, some operating wholly inter-
state," are held none the less interstate commerce, if such commerce 
is the practical and essential result of all that is done. If Congress 
cannot control senatorial primaries as part of the control over the 
manner of elections, the states cannot do so, for the election is a 
federal function and the only power of the states is that conferred 
by the federal Constitution, and it is a power not broader than the 
power of Congress to "make or alter such regulations," and is a 
fortiori not "an authority exclusive of that of Congress." Congres-
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sional control over senatorial primaries cannot infringe upon the 
reserved powers of the states, for "they could not reserve power 
over a matter that had no previous existence." If somehow control 
over these primaries could be regarded as a reserved power of the 
states, "the result would be to leave the general government cesti-
tute of the means to insure its own preservation without govern-
mental aid from the states, which they might either grant or with-
hold according to their own will." Such lack of national supremacy 
in the exercise of appropriate national powers is inconsistent with 
a long line of decisions from Marshall's time to this. Even if the 
word "elections" .does not itself cover preliminary elections, control 
over the antecedent steps is essential to effective control over the 
final choice and is therefore within the ancillary powers granted by 
the necessary and proper clause. "Sinister influences exerted upon 
the primaries inevitably have their effect upon the ultimate election 
0
-are employed for no other reason." The choice of many voters 
is determined by the nominations. In states where one political 
party has ovenvhelming predominance the nomination is the sub-
stance and election is a mere form. The suggestion that the sepa-
rate houses might exclude members because of the methods by 
which they secured nomination concedes the close relation between 
the nomination and the election. Control by Congress of the inci-
dents of the nominations is ancillary both to the power to regulate 
the manner of elections and to the major power to legislate through 
a law-making body genuinely representative in character. 
Chief Justice White in his separate dissent emphasizes some of 
the same points. He calls the proposition that the states may regu-
late senatorial primaries free from congressional control "a suicidal 
one," since the power of the states comes from the clause of the 
federal Constitution which gives to Congress an independent and 
a revisory power coterminous with that of the states. The insist-
ence that the primary is distinct from the election receives the char-
acteristic comment that "the influence of who is nominated for elec-
tive office upon the result of the election to fill that office is so known 
of all men that the proposition may be left to destroy itself by its 
own statement." The enactment of senatorial primaries by so many 
states shows "the tenacity of the conviction that the relation of the 
primary to the election is so intimate that the influence of the former 
is largely determinative of the latter." In some cases the result of 
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the primary is in substance "to render the subsequent election merely 
perfunctory." This might have been the result in Michigan had 
one of the candidates who was running in the primaries of both the 
Republican and the Democratic parties been successful in both. 
Though "the plenary reservation in Congress of the power to con-
trol the states in the exercise of the authority to deal with the times, 
places and manner of electing senators and representatives, as orig-
inally expressed :in the Constitution, caused much perturbation in 
the conventions of the several states," and it was definitely stated 
in the Federalist and other papers that. this did not give Congress 
authority to deal with the election of the state legislatures, "this 
only served to emphasize the distinction between the state and fed-
eral power and affords no ground at this late day for saying that 
the reserved state power has absorbed and renders impossible of 
exercise the authority of Congress to regulate the federal power 
concerning the election of United States senators, submitted, to the 
extent provided, to the authority of the states upon the express
0 
condition that such authority should be subordinate to and con-
trolled by congressional regulation." To this is added the :inquiry: 
"Can any other conclusion be upheld except upon the the-
ory that the phantoms of attenuated and unfounded doubts 
concerning the meaning of the Constitution, which have long 
perished, may now be revived for the purpose of depriving 
Congress of the right to exert a power essential to its exist-
ence, and this in the face of the fact that the only basis for 
the doubts which arose in the beginning (the election of 
senators by the state legislatures) has been completely 
removed by the Seventeenth Amendment?" 
This was the last opinion rendered by Chief Justice White-a 
strong nationalist position as the final word of an ex-Confederate 
soldier.26 
The power of Congress to create·the federal land banks and joint-
stock land banks was affirmed in Smith v. Kansas City Title & 
26 In 24 LAW NOTES 124 is a discussion of "unequal representation in 
Congress." A constitutional issue of the methods of law-making by the fed-
eral government is treated! in Lindsay Rogers, "The Power of the President 
to Sign Bills After Congress Has Adjourned", 30 YALE L. J. I. 
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Trust Co.27 Justices Holmes and ·McReynolds expressed no opinion 
on the question, since they insisted that the court did not have juris-
diction of the case. The opinion of the court by Mr. Justice Day 
summarizes the provisions of the Farm Loan Act with respect to 
the organization and control of federal land banks and joint-stock 
land banks, recites their powers to issue bonds and to make loans 
secured by farm mortgages, and seems to lay stress upon the a?thor-
ity conferred upon them to act as depositories of public money and 
as financial agents of the government. It observes that "a principal 
consideration upon which Chief Justice Marshall rested the authority 
to create a bank" was that its formation "was required, in the judg-
ment of Congress, for the fiscal operations 0£ the government," and 
that it was not "within the authority of the court to question the 
conclusion reached by the legislative branch of the government." 
The suggestion of counsel that the power conferred upon the banks 
created by the Farm Loan Act to serve as public depositories and 
fiscal agents of the government is but a pretext was dismissed by 
saying that the court cannot question the motives of Congress. 
The facts that the banks had not yet been designated as deposi-
tories and that they had acted as federal agents only to a limited 
extent were put aside with the remark that "the existence of the 
power under the Constitution is not determined by the extent of 
the exercise of the authority conferred under it." It is made clear 
that no objection to the power exercised arises from the facts that 
the principal business of the banks is private banking and that most 
of ·their stock is privately owned; but it would take a clairvoyant to 
tell just what weight 'vas given to the control exercised by the gov-
ernment and to the authority vested in the Secretary of the Treas-
ury to use the banks as depositories and fiscal agencies. This 
authority is adduced in support of the decision, but is by no means 
definitely stated to be essential. The final paragraph on this .point 
of the case is as follows : 
"We therefore conclude that the creation of these banks, 
and the grant of authority to them to act for the government 
as depositories of public moneys and purchasers of govern-
ment bonds, brings them within the creative power of Con-
gress, although they may be intended, in connection with 
27 255 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 243 (19:n). Seep6 Ir.r.. L. Rlw. 62. 
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other privileges and duties, to facilitate the making of loans 
upon farm security at low rates of interest. This does not 
destroy the validity of these enactments any more than the 
general banking powers destroyed the authority of Congress 
to create the United States Bank, or the authority given to 
national banks to carry on additional activities destroyed the 
authority of Congress to create these institutions." 
Having determined the public character of the banks, the court 
declared that the power to exempt their securities from state and 
federal taxation "necessarily follows."28 
The monetary powers of Congress were held in Baender v. Bar-
nett29 to include authority to forbid and punish "the conscious and 
willing possession, without lawful authority, of any die in the like-
ness or similitude of one used or designated for making genuine 
coin of the United States." The contention of the defendant was 
that the power given to Congress to punish counterfeiting excludes 
authority to punish what is not counterfeiting-i. e., that it is a 
limitation as well as a grant of power. This was said to rest upon 
a misconception both of the counterfeiting clause and of the one 
vesting Congress with power "to coin money" and "regulate the 
Vf!.lue thereof." As to the authority for the statute in question, Mr. 
Justice Van Devanter says: 
"Both [of the clauses referred to] have been considered 
by this court, and the purport of the decisions is (I) that Con-
gress not only may coin money in the literal sense, but also 
may adopt appropriate measures, including the imposition of 
criminal penalties, to maintain the coin in its purity and to 
safeguard the public against spurious, simulated, and debased 
coin; and ( 2) that the power of Congress in that regard is 
in no wise limited by the clause relating to the punishment 
of counterfeiting." 
" The familiar principle that the privileges and immunities clauses 
of the original Constitution and of the Fourteenth Amendment are 
shields against state action only and not against individual action -
28 A question of federal power with respect to banking is discussed in 
Walter Wyatt, "Right of National Banks To Act As Transfer Agents", 7 
VA. L. RJ>v. 594. 
29 255 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 271 (1921). 
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found application in United States v. Wheeler/iii which sustained 
the quashing of a federal indictment against defendants alleged to 
be responsible for the so-called Bisbee deportations. The indict-
ment as paraphrased in the opinion of the Chief Justice charged a 
conspiracy to injure and oppress citizens of the United States-of 
whom some were citizens of Arizona and the rest were citizens of 
other states-of rights and privileges secured to them by the Con-
stitution or laws of the United States. The theory of the prose-
cution, so far as it can be gathered from the opinion of the Chief 
Justice, was that citizens of Arizona have the right and privilege as 
citizens of said state "peacefully to reside and remain therein and 
to be immune from unlawful deportation from that state to another," 
and that citizens of other states have the same right by virtue of 
the privileges and immunities clause of Article 4, Section 2 of the 
original Constitution. Presumably the alleged immunities of the 
citizens of Arizona were predicated upon the fact that they were 
citizens of the United States and so within the privileges and 
immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The fact that the 
deportees were all citizens of the United States was also important 
because the statute under which the indictment was framed applied 
only to the denial to citizens of the United States of rights and 
privileges secured to them by the Constitution or laws of the United 
States. Inasmuch as no law of the United States specifically for-
bade interstate deportations, the defendants violated the statute 
only if they had oppressed United States citizens in the enjoyment 
of immunities secured to them by the federal Constitution. The 
short and simple answer is that the federal Constitution confers 
immunity against state action only and not against the acts of unoffi-
cial individuals. In making this alJswer, however, the Chief Justice 
was neither short nor simple. The justification for his involved and 
roundabout refutation is evidently to be found in the involved and 
roundabout contention of the government, which, unfortunately, is 
not set forth. This contention, says the Chief Justice, is "based, 
not upon the direct result of ·any particular provision of the Con-
stitution, but upon implications arising from that instrument as a 
whole, the conditions existing at the time of its adoption, and the 
consequences inevitably produced from the creation by it of the 
30 254 U. S. 281, 41 Sup. Ct. 133 (1920). See 34 HARV. L. R.Ev. 554 and 
19 MICH. L. ~V. 558. 
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government of the United States." To meet this contention the 
Chief Justice addµces certain general doctrines. Prior to the 
Articles of Confederation, he says, "in all the states * * * the citi-
zens thereof possessed the fundamental right, inherent in citizens 
of all free governments, peacefully to dwell within the limits of 
their respective states * * * and to have free ingress thereto and 
egress therefrom, with a consequent authority in the states to for-
bid and punish violations of this fundamental right." The Articles 
provided that ''the free inhabitants of each of these states * * * 
shall be entitled to all privileges and imµiunities of free citizens 
in the several states; and the people of each state shall have free 
ingress ancf egress to and from any other state." By this provision 
"uniformity was secured, not by lodging power in Congress to deal 
with the subject, but, while reserving in the several states the author-
ity which they had theretofore enjoyed, yet subjecting such authority 
to a limitation inhibiting the power from being used to discrimi-
nate." The Constitution preserved this limitation on discrimination 
"and thus necessarily assumed the continued possession by the states 
of the reserved power to deal with free residence, ingress and 
egress," limiting it only as to discrimination against citizens of other 
states. Thus, there is no basis for the contention that the states are 
without reserved power to deal with the individual wrong com-
plained of in the present proceeding or for the contention "that a 
wrongful prevention by an individual of the enjoyment by a citizen 
of one state in another of rights posse~sed in that state by its own 
citizens was a violation of a right afforded by the Constitution." 
The "second section of Article 4, like the Fourteenth Amendment, 
is directed alone against state action." Cases which have held state 
action to deprive persons of rights guaranteed by the Constitution 
are therefore not apposite. To this is added: 
"Nor is the situation changed by assuming that as a state 
has the power, by depriving its own citizens of the right to 
reside peacefully therein and to free ingress thereto and 
egress therefrom, it may, without violating the prohibitions 
of Article 4 against discrimination, apply a like rule to citi-
zens of other states, and hence engender, outside of Article 
4, a federal right. This must be so, -since the proposition 
assumes that a state could, without violating the fundamental 
limitations of the Constitution, other than those of Article 4, 
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Section 2, enact legislation incompatible with its existence 
as a free government and destructive of the fundamental 
rights of its citizens, and, furthermore, because the premise 
upon which the proposition rests is state action and the exist-
ence of federal power to determine the repugnancy of such 
action to the Constitution, matters which, not being here 
involved, are not disputed." 
This might be taken to imply that citizens of the United States 
may have as such citizens an immunity under the federal Constitu-
tion against unjustifiable deportation by the state of which they 
are citizens, but any such implication seems to be qualified by the 
concluding paragraphs of the opinion, which read: 
"This leads us, furthermore, to point out that the case of 
Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, so much relied upon in the 
argument, is inapplicable, not only because it involved the 
validity of state action, but because the state statute consid-
ered in that case was held to directly burden the perform-
ance by the United States of its governmental functions and 
also to limit the rights of the citizens growing out of such 
functions; and hence it also follows that the observation 
made in Twining v. New I ersey, 2II U. S. 78, 97, to the effect 
that it had been held in the Crandall case that the privilege 
of passing from state to state is an attribute of national citi-
zenship, may here be put out of view as inapposite. 
"With the object of confining our decision to the case 
before us, we say that nothing we have stated must be taken 
as implying a want of power in the United States to restrain 
acts which, although involving ingress or egress into or 
from a state, have for their direct and necessary effect an 
interference with the performance of duties which it is 
incumbent upon the United States to discharge, as illustrated 
in the Crandall case, supra." 
Other cases on powers of the federal government will be reviewed 
in sections dealing with commerce, taxation, and the jurisdiction and 
procedure of courts. Limitations on federal power because of con-
stitutional clauses protecting individual liberty and property will be 
considered in several of the succeeding sections. 
Columbia University. THOMAS REED ·POWELL. 
(To be continued) 
